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Barrington Moore has written many books, and each one repays the
closest reading and rereading. The most impressive fact is that, while
he never writes the same book over and over, his books comprise a
unity. They are all animated by the passion to know why societies are
never decent or at least as decent as they, without superhuman effort,
could be. His passion is not exalted but rather one that is fine in its
simplicity. Not utopia but a more humane life is his aspiration; indeed
a more humane life is his utopia, as impossibly out of reach, perhaps,
as grander visions of perpetual felicity. He stubbornly refuses consola-
tion and persists in his inquiry. Why is so much of life now, why has so
much of life in the past been, hell? Or, when not hell, so full of suffer-
ing of one kind and another?
Moore's first two books, Soviet Politics-The Dilemma of Power,'
and Terror and Progress USSR,2 explored the possibilities for reducing
or eliminating totalitarian terrorism, secrecy, regimentation, and sur-
veillance. From a variety of angles he asked the same question: could
the governance of the Soviet Union become somewhat less degrading
and stultifying to its people, could it become less odious, more decent?
The bulk of his thinking and writing was done while Stalin was still
alive. Yet though Moore thought that totalitarianism-in essence, a
perverse preference for ends that require cruel means-could grow
more and more odious, either some rational reforms or some return to
traditionalist norms could come to dominate the process of evolution.
There was a grudging and therefore more effective hopefulness in
the conclusion of Moore's second book. This hopefulness rested on a
belief that history often works ironically. Greatly reduced, Moore's
t Professor of Political Science, Amherst College.
1. B. MOORE, SoviEr PoLrrIcs-THE DILEMMA OF POWER (1950).
2. B. MOORE, TERROR AND PROGRESS USSR (1954).
1092
Dialectic of Decency
thesis was that the forces that the totalitarian leadership created to
secure their position could not, after a while, function efficiently under
totalitarian control. The security of totalitarianism had required
modernization, but the agencies of modernization-the various bureau-
cratic structures-have come to need a lessening of the irrationality and
arbitrariness of totalitarianism. The agencies have tended to develop
their own commitments to the work of modernization. Thus, the
forces that totalitarianism needed and created may eventually prove to
be the forces that change the nature of their creator. "If peace should
continue for a decade or more, the rationalist or the traditionalist
forces in Soviet society, or some unstable combination of the two, may
do their work of erosion upon the Soviet totalitarian edifice." 3
I do not mean to suggest that Moore's principal intellectual role in
these early books is that of moralist. He is not eager to pass judgment;
he possesses a remarkably uncynical detachment. Yet there is no doubt
that the passion for decency is at the root of his inquiry; and it informs
the analysis of both books.
No matter how reductionist one was, one still could not fashion a
thesis that adequately covered Moore's next four books, the last of
which is Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt.4 There
seems to be some unemphasized but nevertheless important shift in
sentiment from Political Power and Social Theory5 and Social Origins
of Dictatorship and DemocracyG to Reflections on the Causes of Human
Aisely and Injustice. The shift is from a severely qualified hopeful-
ness concerning indefinite human amelioration to an altogether bleak
outlook. In the last essay of Political Power and Social Theory, he said,
"There are compelling grounds for the belief that humanity is subject
to the fate of Sisyphus: forever creating the prerequisites of freedom
and in this very way destroying the possibility of freedom." This sen-
tence reverses the irony found in his thesis concerning Soviet totali-
tarianism. The forces that human ingenuity restlessly engenders at the
behest of the drive to improve the human condition exact a cost that
seems to equal or outweigh their advantages. Yet when he wrote that
sentence Moore was not willing to make it his last word. The essay
ends on a questioning note, with the benefit of the doubt rhetorically
3. Id. at 231.
4. B. MOORE, INJUSTICE: THE SOCIAL BASES OF OBEDIENCE AND REVOLT (1978) [hereinafter
cited by page number only].
5. B. MOORE, POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL THEORY (2d ed. 1962).
6. B. MOORE, SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY (1966).
7. B. MooRE, REFLECTIONS ON THE CAUSES OF HUMAN MISERY (1970).
8. B. MOORE, supra note 5, at 216.
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given to hopefulness.9 Then too, the enormous intellectual effort that
went into Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy must have
been made emotionally possible for Moore by a conviction that survives
all doubts, all the ravages of an exquisite sense of complexity. The
conviction is that Anglo-American liberal constitutional democracy-
the closest approximation to social decency and freedom-has been
worth its cost in bloodshed, exploitation, and neglect. In this instance,
history did not ironically cheat those who aspired to improve the
human condition.
But liberal constitutional democracy is historically rare and is con-
fined mostly to English-speaking societies. An unusual combination of
circumstances prepared the way for it; in particular, the uprooting of
much of the peasantry and the commercialization of part of the aris-
tocracy. Where lords stayed lords and peasants stayed peasants nearly
insuperable obstacles to liberal constitutional democracy presented
themselves. The persistence of feudal relations damaged subsequent
modernization by making it a coercive, state-managed imposition. The
imposition, effected by either revolutionary radicalism or counter-
revolutionary reaction, has suffocated the hope for liberal constitu-
tional democracy, and so far at least, the foundations of a decent
society.
Not only is this approximately decent and free social order his-
torically rare, it is now imperiled from within: the massive concentra-
tions of private economic and public state power have unbalanced the
system and made equality a sham and freedom, in some respects, doubt-
ful.10 Beyond that, Moore is certain that the social and economic pre-
conditions for a decent and free society on a global scale are out of even
the most determined and collective human reach. Given the numbers
of people alive, scarcity must remain the majority condition.
Thus, with time, Moore's pessimism, never far below the surface,
has tended to take him over. The longest exposition of it is Reflections
on the Causes of Human Misery, one of the profoundest works of social
theory in this century. Moore warns against "the defeatist illusion of
impotence,"" but I do not see that he has escaped it himself. He is
persuaded that both liberalism and communism have had their day,
though some elements of both may endure. The motif of the book is
9. Id. at 221.
10. Let us not forget that Moore was one of the three contributors-Robert Paul
Wolff and Herbert Marcuse were the others-to the seminal work of radical criticism, A
Critique of Pure Tolerance. H. MARCUSE, B. MOORE 9- R. WOLFF, A CRITIQUE OF PURE
TOLERANCE (1965).
11. B. MOORE, supra note 7, at 13.
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that all current and regnant doctrines are inadequate either to analyze
the present human condition or to provide remedies or even significant
alleviations for it. They all systematically misunderstand the actuality,
as well as the limits of possibility. The inadequacy is not internally
correctable. Moore himself does not offer his own new, positive doc-
trine. He works destructively. By doing that, he may induce depression
or a beneficial catharsis in the reader; in any case, he clears away
muddles, illusions, and self-serving self-deceptions. Capitalism does not
create, and no kind of socialism (whether centralized or participatory)
can solve, the basic global problems of scarcity, war, cruelty, oppression,
and "general human nastiness." The imperatives of revolutionary vio-
lence and post-revolutionary consolidation are so strict that they are
bound to cause as much evil as they are supposed to remove, or even
more.'
2
The most that can be hoped for in America is "liberalism-with-a-
difference," "'a somewhat radicalized liberalism."'13 The chances for the
success of a movement with that spirit are, however, very slight. The
most likely prospect is for some kind of economic-social breakdown,
followed by a period of panic-stricken repression.
Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery would seem to be the
author's last word, his mind at the end of its tether. What has he left
himself to say? As if to unsettle expectation, Moore has now published
Injustice, a huge, dense, intricate book. As I have said, this latest work
is bleak, as Reflections is bleak. But the pessimism of Reflections is
global in scope and as futurist as it is retrospective in its orientation.
In it, Moore emphasizes the resistance by elites to human betterment
(on the one hand) and the brutal facts of scarcity (on the other hand).
The pessimism of Injustice is, in some respects, different. In a word,
Moore's whole book is an effort to blame the victims, those who suffer,
for their suffering. Quickly one must add that the accusation is soft,
indeed ambiguous: Moore blames himself and all radicals for thinking
or wishing that the situation could be otherwise. People are people;
masses cannot be radical. There is a further complexity. On some
occasions they have been more radical rather than much less radical
than their leadership; and then, as in Germany in the first two years
after the armistice ending the First World War, their leaders betray
them. Reinforcing the ambiguity of the accusation is Moore's fre-
quently repeated contention that modern radical revolutions, unlike
the great political revolutions of English and American history, are
12. Id. at 69-71.
13. Id. at 164.
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bound to do morally unacceptable harm: to increase the sum of human
suffering.
The best concentration of Moore's pessimism comes at the end of his
speculations on the damage that the Social Democratic leadership did
to humane ideals in the period of 1918-1920.14 They crippled liberalism
and suppressed socialism. They made Nazism possible. But what of the
other political alternatives? Moore is much more certain that Nazism
is evil than that either liberalism or socialism is just. His pessimism is
indicated, finally, by the nervous energy of his scepticism. He says:
Another victim of the constellation of circumstances and actions
just mentioned was the socialist alternative. I have not explored
it because the impulse behind it was much weaker and the forces
arrayed against it much stronger at the particular juncture. There
is also the reason that in practice the revolutionary socialist al-
ternative has not turned out to be a humane one. Since the liberal
one has scarcely turned out to have an attractive record on that
score... the suppression of the socialist alternative too was one of
the tragedies of the German revolution.' 5
If, then, the absence of popular revolutionary aspiration is the gTeat
source of the continuation of popular suffering, there may be much
that could be said to vindicate such a dearth of spirit. Still, there is
much to say-Moore finds much to say-to lament it.
In 1967, in between Social Origins and Reflections, Moore published
an essay called The Society Nobody Wants: A Look Beyond Marxism
and Liberalism.16 He here gives a clear expression of the view that a
truly decent society will forever be out of reach because, as the title
says, nobody wants it. What Moore maintains is not that those who
benefit most from radical social change are manipulated into docility,
or are so degraded as to be unable to feel that they deserve better than
they get. Rather, in most circumstances, rationality seems to be on the
side of an irrational social order. Moore says,
[I]f capitalism were the real obstacle to a decent society or if com-
munism were the obstacle, the ordinary citizen would be obliged
to accept the sacrifices involved in the struggle. Because of the
stake he has in his society there is always substantial short-term
rationality in being the good citizen. That short-term rationality




16. Moore, The Society Nobody Wants: A Look Beyond Marxism and Liberalism, in
THE CRITICAL SPIRIT 401 (B. Moore & G. Wolff eds. 1967).
17. Id. at 410-11.
1096
Vol. 88: 1092, 1979
Dialectic of Decency
The old adage that the good is the enemy of the best appears to fit
Moore's analysis. Yet that would be a complacent misunderstanding of
his point. He is really saying that the short-term good is a false good
because it both blocks a real good and generates a real and long-lived
evil. Aware that this thought may be used by elitists of the left or the
right to justify their contempt for the people, Moore attributes the
short-sightedness of the masses to a defensible sense of risk, for at stake
is not only their own immediate survival but also the survival of their
society in a hostile world. Although Moore says his epigram is shallow,
it is not: "the reason we have never had a decent world is because there
have always been too many decent people in it."I s The only trouble is
that the decent understand decency in too narrow a way: they care too
much for its particularist and everyday manifestations, and think little
about structures of decency. They settle for much less than they should.
Despite popular caution and acceptance throughout history, the
world is constantly changing, and some of that motion results from the
reformist or insurrectionary energies of the people. If decency helps to
keep them down, it also helps to make them resist and rebel. The
feeling for decency thus creates what it limits: the ability to say "No"
to existing conditions of life. The thread that ties Injustice together,
I think, is the dialectic (to use jargon) of decency: the ways in which
concern for decency narrows and broadens human aspiration for
decency itself. Injustice is a rich and immense amplification of The
Society Nobody Wants. Precisely because Moore's book is so contin-
uously active against itself-now lamenting popular docility, now sup-
porting it; now rebuking the masses for the conservatism of their
decency, now presenting it with both penetration and affection-bleak
pessimism is not the sole impression one takes away from one's read-
ing. Injustice is also a work of reconciliation: not with the horrors
some inflict on others, but with humanity in that mottled state we call
"all too human."
Moore undertakes a tremendous effort. He tries to put together a
more formal conception of injustice as a way of disciplining, without
superseding, his life-long concern with decency. And he tries to show,
by special reference to the labor agitation and political activity of
German workers from 1848 to the accession of Hitler, the double ef-
fect that the sense of injustice had on those who suffered-the effect
of both encouraging and inhibiting struggle and resistance.
A large part of the book-the first three and last three chapters out
of fifteen-is devoted to the concept of injustice. Moore is driven by
18. Id. at 409.
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the desire not to appear subjective or idiosyncratic in his moral stan-
dard. He assumes that consensus is equivalent to correctness. If all sorts
of cultures, past and present, agree on what is morally wrong then no
room is left for moral disagreement. In reasoning in this manner,
Moore shows that he is haunted by logical positivism and by anthropo-
logical relativism. To the positivist he is saying: I have derived my
concept of injustice from the expressed or implied opinions of nu-
merous and diverse societies: it is not my own arbitrary preference; we
must defer to the world. To the extremists among the anthropological
relativists he is saying: I have combed the historical literature and
sampled the anthropological literature as well, and through all differ-
ences of style, code, environment, past experience, and level of learning
and science, I find that certain relations and conditions are universally
(or nearly universally) characterized as unjust or unfair or indecent.
In his contribution to A Critique of Pure Tolerance he had said
quite simply, "warrants for judgment can be derived from certain
factual aspects of human existence. If we are to live at all, we have to
live in society. And if we are to live in society it may as well be with as
little pain as possible."' 9 Apparently, he is no longer willing to hold
these statements axiomatically.
It may seem odd that he feels the need to spend 200 pages attempting
to explore the nature of injustice, as if he were in any doubt concern-
ing it. At the same time, in attempting to placate positivists and anthro-
pologists, to deal in earnest with the anxieties of relativism, he courts
another danger. I refer to the fact that some could say that there is a
theoretical distinction between consensus (what used to be called ius
gentium or the law of nations) and objective right (ius naturale). This
distinction is analogous to the one Rousseau made between the will of
all and the general will. Widespread opinion is not likely to be wholly
wrong; but the philosopher must keep his distance from the given and
the common and try to attain an understanding of right that does not
derive from consensus, even if it may coincide with consensus. I am not
teaching Moore something he has to learn. In his contribution to A
Critique of Pure Tolerance, he shows that he is aware of the distinc-
tion between the law of nations and the law of nature. He says:
If the argument up to this point is correct, there are no absolute
barriers to objective knowledge and objective evaluation of human
institutions. Objective here means simply that correct and un-
ambiguous answers, independent of individual whims and prefer-
19. Moore, Tolerance and the Scientific Outlook, in H. MARCUSE, B. Moore & R.
Wo.F, suPra note 10, at 67.
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ences, are in principle possible. A real distinction exists, in other
words, between scientific humility and the vagueness that comes
from moral and intellectual cowardice. 20
Why has Moore changed?
I would guess that his anti-elitism has grown ever stronger. His
search for popular consensus as a basis for his concept of injustice-
he is greatly more interested in the absence of injustice than in a posi-
tive and fully worked-out vision of the just society-is, in effect, an act
of dissociation. He refuses alliance with all those, including his close
friend Herbert Marcuse, who claim to know what most do not know or
do not know as well. Moore absolutely rejects the role of moral tutor,
and strongly criticizes anyone who hungers for it. He is terrified not
only of Stalinism, but also of Leninism. He has never had much sym-
pathy for radical student movements. He pays little attention, and that
attention is given only reluctantly, to the part intellectuals play in
publicizing political and social grievances. He only incidentally con-
siders the capacity of some to be shocked by the way in which others
are treated even when they themselves are secure and prosperous: acting
from conscience never appears in Injustice (and perhaps nowhere in
all of Moore's work). He even distances himself, though not consis-
tently, from the very phrase "moral outrage" because it connotes the
condescension of those who do not stiffer in their own flesh and psyche,
but instead pity from a distance, and abstractly. 21 In sum, the people
with all their faults, inhibitions, and even cowardices, must be their
own measure. They must not be given what they do not want. Indeed
they should not be given anything: they should have only what they
take. Moore is the American Orwell.
It therefore would not be especially to the point to engage Moore
in discussions on the nature of moral argument and on the abstract
sources of moral judgment. Whether or not he commits a form of the
naturalistic fallacy, whether or not he gives away too much to the
positivists or the relativists, whether or not he produces a cleanly
shaped conception of justice or injustice-all these questions are
legitimate, but do not reach the heart of Moore's purpose, which is to
elevate the people and diminish all elites.
On the basis of his inquiry into popular expressions of complaint he
arrives at the idea that certain moral judgments are recurrent and
must be connected to innate human nature immersed in universal
social necessities. These judgments tend to be negative, to refer to what
20. Id. at 70.
21. Pp. xiii-xiv.
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is unjust or indecent-though Moore says there are no clear lines be-
tween the negative and the positive, between condemnation and aspira-
tion. His emphasis is on the sufferings sorted out in Reflections on the
Causes of Human Misery. Yet because the middle chapters of the book
are on the condition of German workers from the middle of the
nineteenth century to the first third of the twentieth, he deals not so
much with deep, debasing, dehumanizing oppression and deprivation
as with the struggle to hold on to some past thing that was good, or to
acquire some new advantage not entirely discontinuous with the past
and the present. Moore's stress on decency turns out to be a stress on
the importance of violations-violations of strong but unsophisticated
notions of what is fitting, what is proper, what the general and im-
plicit social contract and the specific and explicit contextual rules tradi-
tionally require. Most of the time discontented people want to be
treated as if they were people with feelings, not as objects; and they
want to be admitted more fully and equally into the prevailing arrange-
ments, rather than dreaming of some radical overturning. Moore even
hints that almost all people in the poorer classes believe in inequality,
provided it bears some relation to work done and needed, and pro-
vided also that no one-unless a slacker-is ignored and left to suffer
and die, or suffer and be humiliated.
Moore's main theoretical work is done in arranging and connecting
the specimens of popular grievance that he has studied. He says that the
sense of injustice may arise when popular moral expectations are
seriously defeated in any of three basic kinds of social relations..2 2 They
are relations between political authority and the people, relations be-
tween social groups established by the division of labor, and relations
between individuals and between social groups established by the
allocation of material and other sorts of rewards. Corruption, cruelty,
waste, incompetence, weakness, all may jeopardize popular acceptance.
In the course of treating these relations and the many ways in which
their impairment may activate an otherwise timid or acceptant mass,
Moore creates a rich and continuously instructive model of social life.
Besides that, he furnishes the substance of an overall theory of legiti-
macy-not only political legitimacy, but also the legitimacy of all
human relations, major and minor, private and public, formal and
informal. Through all his exposition, all his examples, all his subtleties
and qualifications, the tendency of his mind is unmuffled. He is
tenaciously pursuing the common sense of minimal decency, the bread
22. Pp. 3-48.
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and water of the moral life. He gives that sense the first and last word.
He is guided by it and defers to it.
Moore's moral posture does have its costs. Leave aside the disfavor in
which he holds moral prophecy, moral regeneration, periodic "revalua-
tion of values." All of these are indispensable responses to the human
condition, indispensable catalysts of human betterment, even though
they are the work of one or a few. Let us attend, instead, to a simpler
matter. Suppose the oppressed lack any universalist sense of decency and
are thus unable to break through the walls of their conventions. They
do not accept their situation: they do not even see that theirs is a situa-
tion to be judged at all, and then accepted or rejected. Rousseau said,
"[s]laves lose everything in their chains, even the desire of escaping
from them. '123 For Rousseau that was the worst part of slavery: the
insensible loss of soul, so to speak. What is at stake here is not the
weakness of response but the absence of reflection and self-reflection.
Moore takes up the cases of the Untouchables and inmates in concen-
tration camps, and tries to explain the acceptance of suffering he
finds.2 4 His analysis is resourceful. He is persuaded that in some ex-
treme circumstances the spirit of revolt, fired by the sense of intoler-
able injustice, cannot arise, thanks to a system of beliefs that everyone
accepts or to a systematic atomization of group life and a corresponding
disintegration of elemental self-respect. But what should the analyst's
attitude be? Moore lets the victims off.
Now, it is easy and cheap to feel sorry, of course. But it would be
worse only to feel sorry. One would not feel sorry enough unless one
blamed the victims-this time with an intensity that is altogether dif-
ferent from the "blame" I have already said Moore assigns to the op-
pressed. No, one must hate those who go on living a nonhuman life,
either never having thought it nonhuman or having lost the ability to
recognize it as such. Then, one must hate oneself for one's hatred; and
pray not to be tested. But not to go through a sequence something like
this is not to take the measure of the situation, but rather to fix victims
in their victimage forever, to understand the situation only anthropo-
logically.
The attitude I propose is made possible only by a tenacity equal to
Moore's, but working contrarily. One must hold tenaciously to inde-
pendence of moral judgment: one must remain independent of anthro-
pology. At the least, one must cling to the core of the ius gentium; but,
really, that will probably not turn out to offer enough incitement to
23. J. J. RoussEAu, THE SOCIAL CoNTRACr AND DiscouRsEs 6 (G. Cole trans. 1950).
24. Pp. 49-50, 55-80.
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independence. The ius gentium used to allow slavery. One must hold
to a conception of human dignity that is not within the reach of the
common sense of minimal decency, that is beyond biology and pro-
priety, so that the full horror of certain conditions not be attenuated.
Of course, it is absurd to blame those who seem unable to imagine
decency, let alone a higher dignity. But the absurdity must be lived
with, not philosophized away. Else, the loss of human honor is too
great.
Sustaining one in this seeming inhumanity is the hope that the
anthropologists and the social psychologists are wrong; that despite
appearances, Untouchables, inmates, and slaves know their life for
what it is, resent it, and would change it if they could; they know that
they not only suffer in their physical being but also in their humanity.
Moore may not put up enough of a fight with his own anthropological
tendencies, despite his firm attachment to the ius gentium. There may
be significant commonalities even when there appear not to be any.
If, however, Moore is right about Untouchables and camp inmates, and
it is consequently delusive to believe that resentment will show itself
under all circumstances in which we have a right to expect it, then the
point remains. We must hate the victims, and punish ourselves for our
hatred.
I do not mean to make too much of this quarrel. Let us say that I
have tried to point to the area of Moore's greatest vulnerability. In any
case, Moore's subject is not the depths of suffering. Using Germany's
rich modem history as a central though not necessarily typical record
of the experience of resistance to injustice, he patiently distills a gen-
eral meaning. He studies German workers through their own self-
observation when possible and thus allows us to hear the uncoached
voices of people at or near the bottom of the social pyramid. A lot of
Moore's account deals with miners and iron and steelworkers in the
Ruhr from the 1880s to the brief revolutionary period, 1918-1920.2 5
The account is dominated by Moore's conviction that proletarian
class-consciousness, in the Marxist sense, was almost nonexistent.26
Moore doubts whether it is proper even to think of German workers
as a proletariat: dispossessed, miserable, and eager for a radical recon-
struction of their society. He does not find anything resembling this
state of being. Nor does he find very much envy or appetite for ven-
geance-little ressentiment. He finds what he must have been glad to
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tract, as violation of mostly traditional minimal decencies. 27 He is not
glad, however, that the workers were only episodically willing to over-
come their inhibitions and take direct action in behalf of their own
interest in securing or expanding or even acquiring the conditions of
decency. He would have had them more constantly pugnacious.
The conquest of the feeling that suffering and deprivation are in-
evitable is, in Moore's view, the key to action.28 The idea must get
started that conditions are correctable because their source is human
intention rather than nature or fate or God's will. Once it does get
started, "iron in the soul" may form.2 9 Public authority is no longer
seen as parental: people grow up. But that maturity is hard to main-
tain; the human wish is to relax when the establishment relents and
makes some concessions. Even when the German workers were more
radical than their leadership, as under Ebert in the earliest days of the
Republic, they were, for the most part, seeking to ward off reactionary
repression and to defend the beginnings of decent political institutions.
Moore accepts Lenin's insistence that workers left to themselves develop
only a trade-union mentality, never a revolutionary one. Where Lenin
takes this argument to an elitist conclusion, Moore sides with the
workers. Lenin and Leninism frighten him much more than the work-
ers' narrowness of horizon.
Reading Moore's lengthy story, one has the impression of intimate
acquaintance with nameless individuals. That effect is one of the won-
ders of the book and constitutes its fundamental humanity. To be sure,
some workers capitulated to the early charms of Nazism. Moore con-
siders that issue because Hitler's movement found strength in popular
notions of injustice. But Moore shows that in proportion to their
numbers the workers bear a much smaller responsibility for Hitler's
regime than other groups in German society.30
If the book has villains, they are Ebert and his circle. In a remark-
able chapter, "The Suppression of Historical Alternatives: Germany
1918-1920," 1 Moore works on the assumption that it is justifiable to
hold political actors accountable for things they did not do but could
have done. They need not have jumped outside their skins; that is,
they did not have to make some enormously difficult leap of faith or
perform some brilliant act of imagination of which only an intellectual
vanguard is capable. Hoping for this sort of Leninist or Marcusean
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self-emancipation is foreign to Moore's entire outlook. All that was
needed was for Ebert to be the socialist he claimed to be, or, even, to
be, more moderately, a republican and a constitutionalist. Instead he
was half in love with the old regime, and more concerned with order
than with decency. In contrast to him, the workers, though hardly
possessed by a Marxist vision of transformation, saw through and
beyond the social order Ebert and his circle were trying to preserve,
and tried to stand up for basic freedom and decency. The workers'
most extreme demands were the result of shock at the reactionary ex-
cesses of the Social Democratic government and of putschists who were
even worse. For failing to be as advanced as their own following, the
leadership preserved those forces that were to reassert themselves under
Nazism. The upshot was inconceivable tragedy for the world.
It is fitting that Moore includes these conjectures in his book. Quite
without sentimentality he labors to establish the salience of the notion
of decency; and repelled by the powerful and the arrogant, yet dis-
trustful of gentility and impatient with timidity, he has written an
epic with the workers as the hero. Naturally, the heroism could not be
grand: if one wanted it to be, one would still be enthralled by the old
regime, as Ebert, in his somewhat different way, was. Though not
grand, this heroism has all the majesty of ordinariness when ordinari-
ness raises itself to its true stature. Moore's book makes this intermit-
tent achievement poignant, and all the more so by insisting that it can
be only intermittent. His scholarship is thus a complex act of justice.
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